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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1994, South Africa emerged from under the rule of 
an oppressive Apartheid state to embrace a new set of 
principles and values guided by the ideal of 
constitutionalism.3 The nation adopted a Constitution4 
designed to propel the country from autocratic rule to a 
democracy built on egalitarian values. In the spirit of 
constitutionalism, the South African government’s powers 
are exclusively drawn from the Constitution, and its roles 
and responsibilities are continuously clarified through 
judgments of the Constitutional Court (Court). Furthermore, 
the norms articulated in the Constitution, which the South 
African state has committed to uphold, are constantly given 
content through judgments of the Court. Much like the state, 
the Court’s primary interpretative anchor is the 
Constitution.5 In fulfilling its role as the check on the 
democratic institutions, it is bound exclusively by the 
perimeters of the Constitution. The result of this remarkable 
transition is that the Court is placed between the values 
contained in the Constitution on the one hand, and the 
values held by the population reflected through the prism of 
the executive and parliament on the other. While this has 
                                                
	
	
3 See generally, Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the 
Interim Bill of Rights, 10 SOUTH AFRICAN J. ON HUM. RTS. 31 (1994). 
4 S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
5 Id. at § 1. 
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created a standard to which South Africa is held to, it also 
serves to remind us of what we have still to achieve.  
This paper seeks to deal with instances in which the 
executive arm of the state fails to adhere to constitutional 
norms and standards in the implementation of judicial 
decisions. Several scholars have examined the Court’s role in 
the newly formed constitutional democracy and the non-
compliance by the executive with the Court’s judgments. 
Theunis Roux, in attempting to explain the interaction 
between the South African Constitutional Court and the 
executive, has generously concluded that the Court’s 
technique in coaxing the executive’s adherence to principles 
elucidated in court judgments consists of a deft use of 
pragmatism, as well as principle.6 In this way, he has argued 
that the Court has attempted to protect and build its 
independence from political control by maneuvering 
through the political circumstances peculiar to South Africa 
and thus ensuring that its judgments are perceived as 
effective.7 Several other South African scholars have taken a 
critical view of the Court’s reluctance to grant the values in 
the Constitution their fullest meaning, opining that such 
reluctance of the Court exemplifies the Court employing 
avoidance strategies so as not to risk its institutional 
independence by demanding too much of executive 
                                                
	
	
6 THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICS OF PRINCIPLE 87 (2013). Roux wrote with 
specific reference to the period of the Constitutional Court that spanned 
the first ten years of democracy in South Africa, from 1995 to 2005. At its 
heart, Roux’s argues that the Court was able to build and protect its 
institutional independence during its infancy by employing a strategy 
across its judgments that involved alternating between producing 
pragmatic and principled judgments. 
7 Id. at 29. 
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decision-making.8 They argue that the effect of the Court’s 
approach is to water down the intended strength of rights 
enshrined in the Constitution, thus depriving those in need 
of substantive justice.9 
What this paper will attempt to show is that, 
regardless of how one perceives the Court’s strategy with 
respect to the executive, there have been instances in which 
the Court has developed a substantive interpretation of 
constitutional principles, ordered that the executive adhere 
to those principles, and the executive has not complied. 
Assuming Roux’s paradigm of principle and pragmatism 
reflects the strategy currently employed by the Court, 
executive non-compliance may be seen merely as the Court 
failing to rely on pragmatism where it would have been wise 
to do so. This paper suggests that the Court’s approach 
towards the executive, while relevant, is not the only factor 
leading to non-compliance of state actors. Rather, there are 
other dynamics that influence the extent to which the state 
has adopted constitutional norms in its behavior. 
In reflecting on the instances where a gap has 
emerged between judgments produced by the courts when 
interpreting the Constitution and decisions made by the 
executive in carrying out its administrative duties, focus 
must shift to the institutional dynamics that govern the 
decision-making processes of the executive. In doing so, we 
assume that the manifestation of the normative 
commitments of the state are entirely dependent on the 
behavior of what has been termed as “street-level 
                                                
	
	
8 Brian Ray, Evictions, Aspirations and Avoidance, 5 CONST. CT. REV. 173, 
219 (2013); see also David Bilchitz, Avoidance Remains Avoidance: Is it 
Desirable in Socio-Economic Rights Cases?, 5 CONST. CT. REV. 297 (2013). 
9 See Ray, supra note 8, at 175; see generally, Bilchitz, supra note 8. 
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bureaucrats,”10 or bureaucrats that occupy positions at the 
public-facing level of administrative bodies, such as police 
officers, teachers, immigration officials, and recruitment 
officials.  
The question then becomes, what creates a gap 
between judicial decisions, rooted in the Constitution, and 
the actions of street-level bureaucrats? The answer to this 
question is likely complex and multi-faceted. It should begin 
with the fact that the necessity for bureaucratic leaders to 
delegate functions to lower level officials carries with it a 
degree of discretion when carrying out those functions. This 
inherent discretionary power that accompanies such 
delegation results in the potential for a gap between the 
policies girded by constitutional values and the behavior of 
those individuals on whom such policies rely for 
implementation. We would postulate that at least two 
important factors exist that guide the use of administrative 
discretion and lead to the gap between what ordinary 
citizens experience when engaging with state actors and the 
ideal of how the law should be implemented as articulated 
in court judgments.  
The first factor is the divergence between 
constitutional or legal norms and social norms. In making 
the arguments that follow in this paper, we have taken the 
term constitutional norms to represent those norms 
embodied within the Constitution, otherwise recognized as 
the rights and principles clearly articulated in the actual text 
of that document. We define legal norms as those norms 
created by the judiciary based on their understanding of the 
                                                
	
	
10 See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS 
OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (2d ed. 2010). 
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Constitution. Legal norms give substance and content to 
constitutional norms. Finally, social norms are norms held 
by groups within society and guide decision-making of 
individuals within those groups. They consist of the 
informal rules that each individual feels obligated to follow 
and that are enforced through non-legal means that exist 
within social groups.  
As members of society, street-level bureaucrats carry 
with them the social norms that exist in the communities or 
social groupings from which they are drawn. Significant 
literature detailing the value and effects of social norms in 
guiding behavior suggests that despite the presence of 
formal controls, such as rules and regulations, social norms 
play a large role in influencing individual decision-making.11 
As a result, the potential exists for street-level bureaucrats to 
be guided by their social norms more tangibly than by the 
formal rules that emanate from within their administrative 
institutions, the Constitution, or the Court.  
The second factor on which the implementation of 
judicial decision-making is contingent is the process of 
communication of those decisions by the judiciary to the 
executive and within the executive itself. Poor 
communication of legal norms ensures that they remain 
ineffective. Even where judicial decisions seek to merely 
express the existence of constitutional principles and do not 
require specific action on the part of state actors, effective 
communication is necessary for that expression to have any 
impact on executive behavior.     
In accurately describing the scope of this paper, it 
may be important to briefly describe the subjects and 
                                                
	
	
11 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORHOODS 
SETTLE DISPUTES 137-155 (1991). 
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arguments that may fall within the broader topic of a court’s 
relationship with the executive and the public, but do not 
fall within the aims of this paper and are thus not dealt with 
in great detail. First, it may be argued that court judgments 
have value as an expression of a legal norm.12 Judgments 
make normative statements on the law which enter the arena 
of public discourse. Such a legal norm can then, through 
various mechanisms external to the direct links between the 
court and the executive, have an impact on both executive 
decision-making and the norms adopted by the public.13 
Rather than enter this debate, this paper seeks to explain the 
reasons for the instances in which the state, as the addressee 
of a judgment, is unable (or unwilling) to comply with its 
order. While the argument can be made that the executive 
will eventually comply and that therefore legal norms will 
animate administrative decision-making, such a belief does 
not explain the reasons for the executive’s incapacity to 
manifest such norms when first ordered to do so. 
Second, the gap between judicial decision-making 
and the executive branch’s enforcement can be explained as 
the product of a country in the midst of a difficult 
democratic transition. Much like any legal transplant or 
constitutional borrowing, it simply takes time for norms and 
standards to internalize and effectively guide behavior.14 
While this may be true, this explanation fails to examine 
more closely the particular dynamics that exist within the 
                                                
	
	
12 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021, 2022 (1996); see generally Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and 
Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998). 
13 See generally Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 577 (1993). 
14 ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW, CULTURE AND SOCIETY: LEGAL IDEAS IN THE 
MIRROR OF SOCIAL THEORY 117-126 (2006). 
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executive which allow for a gap between constitutional or 
legal norms and social norms to influence the 
implementation of judicial decisions.15 More importantly, 
the transitional democracy argument does not clarify how 
the difference in norms manifests within the administrative 
state.  
The value of a deeper analysis of these dynamics as 
opposed to simply relying on the notion of transitional 
democracy is that such an understanding can be used to 
target and remedy the disjuncture between constitutional 
norms and executive action that prevent the realization of 
constitutional goals and ultimately slow the process of 
transition from Apartheid to the reality the Constitution 
envisions.  
Finally, we concede that non-compliance by 
administrative agencies with judicial-decision making has 
only, even if repeatedly, occurred in certain pockets of the 
bureaucracy. It is not the intention of this paper to overstate 
a decline in the courts’ legitimacy or to suggest that the 
executive has adopted a general stance of defiance towards 
judicial decisions. Rather, we hope merely to demonstrate 
that an assurance of executive compliance with judicial 
decision-making is subject to the pressure exerted by the 
                                                
	
	
15 For examples of analysis and case law on the impact of a democratic 
transition on the executive and its indifferent response to constitutional 
norms, see STEPHEN PETE, BEHIND THE MASK OF THE RAINBOW NATION: 
THE LIMITS OF LAW IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA, IN NATION-
BUILDING & TRANSFORMATION 169, 185-196 (Catherine Jenkins & Max 
du Plessis eds. 2014); Clive Plasket, Administrative Justice and Social 
Assistance, 120 SOUTH AFRICAN L. J. 494 (2003); David Dyzenhaus, The 
Pasts and Future of the Rule of Law in South Africa, 124 SOUTH AFRICAN L. J. 
734, 758 (2007); MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v. Kate 2006 (4) 
SA 478 (SCA) at para. 5. 
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social norms adopted by street-level bureaucrats, as well as 
the methods of communicating constitutional norms 
between all relevant institutions and individuals responsible 
for norm creation and implementation.  
Ultimately, the lack of acquiescence to judicial 
decisions by certain branches of the executive serves as a 
barrier to the courts’ ability to engage effectively in norm 
creation. This in turn impacts access to justice for ordinary 
citizens in a very tangible way when street-level bureaucrats, 
who adhere to social norms not necessarily consistent with 
the constitutional or legal norms, are tasked with decisions 
intended to implement judicial decisions. 
In the following section, we briefly outline examples 
in which the executive has failed to comply with judicial 
decisions, despite ample opportunity to do so. These 
examples aim to demonstrate the way in which such non-
compliance significantly impacts access to justice and the 
subsequent need to develop strategies to remedy the 
executive’s non-compliance. In Part III, we examine the 
nature of the executive branch and its responses to judicial 
decisions. Part IV discusses the importance of social norms 
in guiding executive behavior, and Part V looks carefully at 
the role of communication between the judiciary and the 
executive in the effective implementation of judicial 
decisions. 
 
II. COURT DECISIONS AND EXECUTIVE ACQUIESCENCE  
 
A. ILLEGAL DETENTION AND DEPORTATION: THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS 
 
Over the past five years, the Department of Home 
Affairs (Department) has been notorious in its refusal to 
comply with court judgments. In terms of the Immigration 
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Act, the Department is tasked with upholding legislation 
relating to foreigners, including illegal foreigners and 
asylum seekers.16 The Immigration Act is one of the main 
pieces of legislation governing the Department’s actions. The 
Act allows for immigration officials to detain illegal 
foreigners pending a determination of their status.17 
However, a person may only remain in detention for more 
than 48 hours if it has been determined that he or she is an 
illegal foreigner and is being held pending deportation.18 
Section 34(1) of the Act provides those declared to be illegal 
foreigners with procedural safeguards during their 
detention in order to protect them from unlawful 
deportation, including the right to request an appeal and to 
demand a warrant from the court for their detention. 
In 2003, Lawyers for Human Rights challenged the 
constitutionality of specific sections of a previous version of 
the Immigration Act that gave wide discretion to 
immigration officials to arrest, detain, and deport foreigners 
without procedural protections.19 The High Court declared 
these sections unconstitutional and this finding was upheld 
by the Constitutional Court in Lawyers for Human Rights.20 In 
that judgment, the Court confirmed the need for procedural 
safeguards, as stipulated in Section 34(1) of the new 
Immigration Act, and found that the absence of similar 
safeguards in the challenged provision of the Act relating to 
foreigners not yet in South Africa, but at a point of entry, 
                                                
	
	
16 Immigration Act 13 of 2002 (S. Afr.). 
17 Id. § 41. 
18 Id. § 34. 
19 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v. Minister of Home Affairs and 
Another 2003 (8) BCLR 891 (T). 
20 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v. Minister of Home Affairs and 
Another 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC) [hereinafter “Lawyers for Human Rights”]. 
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was unconstitutional.21 The Court makes clear that in order 
to comply with Section 36 of the Constitution, which allows 
for the limitation of rights under certain circumstances, 
immigration officials must follow procedural safeguards that 
protect the rights of foreigners attempting to gain entry into 
the country.22 In so doing, the Court highlighted the 
importance of the provisions contained in Section 34(1) of 
the Immigration Act to the constitutionality of immigration 
procedures.23 
Despite the Court’s clear pronouncement on the 
necessity of procedural safeguards, the Department has 
repeatedly failed to comply with the procedures contained 
in Section 34(1). In 2010, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA)24 heard a case regarding the detention of an illegal 
foreigner for a period exceeding 30 days without a court 
warrant, which is one of the safeguards provided for in 
Section 34(1).25 The SCA, citing Lawyers for Human Rights, 
made clear the importance of the right not to be detained 
any longer than necessary without a court warrant to justify 
the detention.26 
Two years later, the Department was brought before 
the High Court for again, amongst other things, detaining a 
foreigner for a period exceeding 30 days without obtaining a 
                                                
	
	
21 Id. at para 43. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 The Supreme Court of Appeal is the second highest court of appeal in 
the country, after the Constitutional Court. 
25 Immigration Act § 34(1). See Arse v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others 
2010 (4) SA 544. 
26 Id. at 552. 
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court warrant justifying that extension.27 The detention was 
found to be unlawful.  
More recently, in August 2014, the Department was 
again brought before the High Court, this time by the South 
African Human Rights Commission, for lack of compliance 
with Section 34(1) of the Immigration Act.28 Despite the fact 
that the courts have repeatedly found that non-compliance 
with Section 34(1)’s procedural safeguards is 
unconstitutional, the Department attempted to justify its 
actions by stating that it is impossible to detain foreigners for 
less than 120 days pending deportation because foreign 
embassies routinely fail to cooperate.29 No evidence was 
presented to support this assertion.30 The Department 
argued that under such circumstances, their officers should 
be granted discretion to extend a foreigner’s detention where 
reasonable or justifiable.31 
In a scathing judgment, the High Court found the 
detention practices of the Department unconstitutional and 
highlighted the Department’s repeated disregard for judicial 
decision-making: 
 
[T]his Court and many other courts all over the 
country, including the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, have stated that detention of illegal 
foreigners for more than 30 days and 120 days 
without a valid warrant of arrest is unlawful 
and unconstitutional. In spite of these judicial 
                                                
	
	
27 Sikuola v. The Minister of Home Affairs [2012] ZAGPJCH 98. 
28 Id. at para. 34. 
29 See South African Human Rights Commission and 40 Others and the 
Minister of Home Affairs: Naledi Pandor and 4 Others 2014 ZAGPJCH.  
30 Id. at para. 36. 
31 Id. at para. 40. 
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pronouncements, the respondents still persist 
in detaining illegal foreigners for more than 30 
days and a maximum of 120 days without 
valid warrants having been issued.32  
The High Court proceeded to direct the Department 
to provide the South African Human Rights Commission 
with regular written reports on all foreign individuals 
detained in their facilities to ensure compliance with the 
legislation and court orders.33 Given the Department’s 
failure to comply in the past, the Court concluded that “[a]n 
order without continued monitoring and reporting will be 
ineffective in vindicating the rights of detainees.”34 
A similar pattern of non-compliance with judicial 
decision-making exists in the Department’s deportation 
practices. In 2001, the Constitutional Court held in 
Mohamed35 that to deport an illegal foreigner to a country 
where he or she will stand trial and face the death penalty is 
a violation of that person’s constitutional right to life and 
dignity unless assurances can be made by the foreign 
country that the death penalty will not be imposed.36 In that 
judgment, the Court made clear that to deport an individual 
to a country where he or she may face the death penalty 
“ignores the commitment implicit in the Constitution that 
South Africa will not be party to the imposition of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment.”37 
                                                
	
	
32 Id. at para. 45. 
33 Id. at para. 52. 
34 Id. at para. 44. 
35 Mohamed and Another v. President of the RSA and Others 2001 ZACC 18; 
2001 (3) SA 893 (CC) [hereinafter “Mohamed”]. 
36 Id. at para. 60. 
37 Id. at para. 58. 
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In 2010, the High Court restated the principle 
established in Mohamed when the Department again decided 
to deport two foreign nationals who upon deportation 
would face trial and possible execution.38 The Department, 
despite the clear holding in Mohamed, defended it’s actions 
and argued that because the foreign country in this case had 
refused to provide assurances that the death penalty would 
not be imposed, the Department had no choice but to deport 
the illegal foreigner.39 In upholding the High Court’s 
judgment, the Court reiterated its earlier holding, making 
clear the principle that the government of South Africa may 
not, under any circumstances or in any capacity, participate 
in the imposition of the death penalty on any individual.40 
A stark example of non-compliance with judicial 
decision-making by the Department can be seen in a pair of 
judgments handed down by Judge Davis of the Western 
Cape High Court.41 The case concerned the deportation of an 
Uzbek national, Ms. Mukhamadiva, who arrived at the Cape 
Town International Airport with a valid visa.42 Ms. 
                                                
	
	
38 Tsebe and Another v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Pitsoe v. 
Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2012 (1) BCLR 77 (GSJ) at para. 87. 
39 Id. at para. 89. 
40 Minister of Home Affairs and Others v. Tsebe and Others 2012 ZACC 16; 
2012 (5) SA 467 (CC). This is a particularly interesting example, as Roux 
relied on the Court’s judgment in Makwanyane abolishing the death 
penalty as an example of successful acquiescence by the executive in the 
face of overwhelming public opposition. It is interesting to note then that 
the norm failed to animate the executive’s decision making in both 
Mohamed and Tsebe. 
41 Mukhamadiva v. Director General of Home Affairs and Another 2011 
ZAWCHC 483 [hereinafter “Mukhamadiva I”]; Mukhamadiva v. Director 
General Department of Home Affairs and Another 2012 ZAWCHC 337 
[hereinafter “Mukhamadiva II”]. 
42 Mukhamadiva I at para. 1-2. 
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Mukhamadiva was deported before an investigation could 
be conducted into the legality of her presence in South 
Africa, despite the fact that a court order had been issued 
instructing the Department officials to appear in court the 
following day to show cause for why Ms. Mukhamadiva 
should not be permitted to enter the country.43 The Chief 
Immigration Officer at the Cape Town Airport, Mr. Hans 
Grobbler, received the court order, but was instructed by his 
superior not to comply.44 Mr. Grobbler insisted on non-
compliance with the court order and refused to speak to the 
Judge who had issued the order over the phone when asked 
to do so.45 Ms. Mukhamadiva was returned to her home 
country without a hearing and in violation of the court 
order.46  
The issue that was subsequently heard by the High 
Court was whether or not Mr. Grobbler acted in contempt of 
court by refusing to comply with the court order.47 During 
the proceedings, two reasons for Mr. Grobbler’s non-
compliance were highlighted by the parties. First, he was 
told by a superior that an order citing only the Director 
General and the Minister of Home Affairs prevented an 
immigration officer, like Mr. Grobbler, from obeying that 
order.48 Second, the Head of Immigration for the Western 
Cape was on record stating that court orders must be served 
on Parliament leading to Mr. Grobbler’s misunderstanding 
as to the nature of court orders and their implementation.49 
                                                
	
	
43 Id. at paras. 4-5. 
44 Id. at para. 6. 
45 Id. at paras. 6-7. 
46 Id. at paras. 4-5, 9. 
47 Id. at para. 9. 
48 Mukhamadiva I at para. 11. 
49 Id. at para. 12. 
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Mr. Grobbler’s reaction to a court order stems from a 
much larger issue of procedure and compliance with judicial 
decision-making by the Department. His refusal to speak to 
a judge over the phone further demonstrates “a clear 
breakdown between the department and court.”50 Thus, 
while the Court found that Mr. Grobbler was not in 
contempt of court, it noted what appeared to be a “serious 
lack of education that immigration officials require in order 
to deal with these difficult questions which could allow 
them to implement the law and safeguard legal rights.”51 
In light of clear misinformation circulating within the 
Department of Home Affairs, Judge Davis proceeded to 
order the Head of Immigration for the Western Cape to 
submit a report detailing current procedures, followed by 
officials served with an urgent order and whether a plan 
would be adopted to educate immigration officials in how to 
comply with court orders.52 
The report that was subsequently submitted to the 
Court revealed that the Department’s procedures had been 
based on a misinterpretation of international law.53 This 
misunderstanding led to the conclusion that immigration 
officials have no authority in an international airport.54 In an 
advisory judgment, Davis concluded that the report and the 
Department’s procedures are “manifestly flawed” and 
cannot, under either international law or the Constitution, 
“justify the approach to the enforcement of court orders” 
adopted by the Department.55 He makes the judgment 
                                                
	
	
50 Id. at para. 13. 
51 Id. at para. 12. 
52 Id. at para. 14. 
53 Id. at para. 9. 
54 Mukhamadiva I at paras. 8-9. 
55 Id. at para. 20. 
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available to the Department with the objective that adequate 
policy “reflecting the Department’s commitment to the 
Constitution and the rule of law be followed in the future.”56 
 
B. ATTITUDES ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE ACT AND COMPLIANCE 
 
Domestic violence is a particularly complicated area 
of law to regulate because of the private and intimate nature 
of the crime. Domestic abuse occurs in the home and the 
perpetrator is someone close to and often loved by the 
victim. Because they are private, both the scene of the crime 
and the relationship between victim and abuser are spaces 
that are traditionally protected from state intervention. As a 
result, domestic violence is often viewed as a family matter 
and officials are often reluctant to intervene in that space to 
turn what otherwise appears to be a civil matter into a 
criminal one. The first piece of legislation designed to 
combat domestic violence in South Africa, the Prevention of 
Family Violence Act of 1993 (PFVA),57 reflected the view that 
domestic violence is, at its core, a family issue in the 
following explanation of its purpose: “The purpose of this 
draft bill . . . is to make simpler, shorter and more effective 
procedure possible. A new, more effective system may 
contribute to a strategy to deal with domestic violence 
outside the criminal courts in order to maintain family 
unity.”58  
                                                
	
	
56 Id. at para. 21. 
57 Prevention of Family Violence Act 33 of 1993 (S. Afr.). 
58 From the explanatory memorandum of the draft Bill, see Joanne Fedler, 
Lawyering Domestic Violence Through the Prevention of Family Violence Act 
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It is clear from the above that the intention of the 
PFVA was, to the extent possible, to keep domestic violence 
outside of the criminal space. The priority was also to keep 
families together. This view clearly misunderstands the 
nature of domestic violence and the need to prioritize the 
safety of abused women over all else, including family unity. 
Research has shown that tactics like mediation and 
counseling designed to bring a victim and batterer back 
together are detrimental to the victim and very rarely reduce 
levels of violence.59 
In 1996, in light of concerns raised regarding the 
PFVA, the South African Law Commission formed a 
committee of feminist lawyers and experts in domestic 
violence in order to make recommendations on amendments 
to the PFVA.60 The product of this was the Domestic 
Violence Act of 1998 (DVA), which, among other things, 
expanded the definition of a domestic relationship, defined 
specific acts of violence (including economic ones), and did 
away with sheriff’s fees for service of court orders.61 
Twelve days before the DVA came into force, the 
Constitutional Court handed down judgment in a case 
challenging the legality of provisions of the PFVA (and, by 
extension, equivalent provisions of the DVA) that allow a 
court to authorize a warrant of arrest when it issues a 
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protective order but suspend that warrant on condition that 
the protective order not be violated.62 Justice Sachs, writing 
for the Court, refers to sections of the Constitution and 
international treaty obligations that create a duty on the state 
to deal effectively with domestic violence.63 Section 12(1)(c) 
of the Constitution provides that everyone “has the right to 
freedom and security of the person, which includes the right 
to be free from all forms of violence from either public or 
private sources.”64 Read with Section 7(2) of the 
Constitution,65 Justice Sachs states, “section 12(1) has to be 
understood as obliging the state directly to protect the right 
of everyone to be free from private or domestic violence.”66 
The Court, in emphasizing the duty of the state to 
protect individuals from harm from private sources, makes 
clear that the private nature of domestic violence cannot be 
used to justify inaction by state actors. Earlier in the same 
paragraph, Sachs writes: 
 
All crime has harsh effects on society. What 
distinguishes domestic violence is its hidden, 
repetitive character and its immeasurable 
ripple effects on our society and, in particular, 
on our family life. It cuts across class, race, 
culture and geography, and is all the more 
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pernicious because it is so often concealed and 
so frequently goes unpunished.67  
Not only can the nature of domestic violence not be 
used to justify inaction by the state, the Court goes on to 
comment on the systemic problems of inaction: 
 
The ineffectiveness of the criminal justice 
system in addressing family violence 
intensifies the subordination and helplessness 
of the victims. The also sends an unmistakable 
message to the whole of society that the daily 
trauma of vast numbers of women counts for 
little. The terrorization of the individual 
victims is thus compounded by a sense that 
domestic violence is inevitable. Patterns of 
systemic sexist behaviour are normalized 
rather than combatted.68 
 In its discussion of the constitutional principles 
underlying domestic violence legislation, the Court clarifies 
the substantive meaning of those constitutional rights and 
the state’s subsequent obligation. In so doing, the Court 
makes clear that the state has a duty to protect individuals’ 
rights to be free from private violence. Furthermore, 
ineffective action by the State and the perpetuation of 
systemic sexist behavior form part of the harm that the state 
has a constitutional obligation to protect individuals from. 
In 2005, the Court had an opportunity to reiterate the 
principles set out in Baloyi in a nearly-identical challenge to 
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the Domestic Violence Act, in Omar.69 Van der Westhuizen, 
writing for the Court, states: 
 
Whereas the privacy of the home and the 
centrality attributed to intimate relations are 
valued, privacy and intimacy often provide the 
opportunity for violence and the justification 
for non-interference . . . . It is understandable 
for the legislature to enact measures that differ 
from those generally applicable to criminal 
arrests and prosecutions. It is clear that the Act 
serves a very important social and legal 
purpose.70 
With these two judgments, the Constitutional Court 
effectively removes domestic violence from the sphere of 
private family matters, and places it squarely within the 
ambit of the state’s obligation to uphold the Constitution. 
This shift in the law’s treatment of domestic violence has 
generally not been reflected in the behavior of street-level 
bureaucrats, like police officers, tasked with upholding the 
law.71 
In a 2006 study in one locality in Mpumalanga, only 
6.7% of cases of domestic violence that were reported to the 
police, courts, or hospitals made it into official police 
statistics as only 63 of these women pressed charges.72 While 
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this could simply be the result of women choosing not to 
press criminal charges against their partners, a more recent 
study in Gauteng found that only 8% of victims interviewed 
were informed by the police that they could press criminal 
charges against their abusers.73 The same study revealed that 
victims were being encouraged to mediate with their 
abusers, rather than have them arrested.74 Another study in 
Mpumalanga found that in 14% of reported cases of 
domestic violence, families were left to settle the matter 
themselves, and in 14.5% the police simply warned the 
perpetrator without taking further action.75 
The above reports demonstrate a continued pattern 
by the police of treating domestic violence as a family matter 
that should be resolved privately without state intervention 
and certainly without involvement of the criminal justice 
system. One of the co-authors of this paper (Vance) interacts 
with victims of domestic violence in her capacity as a legal 
advisor at Lawyers Against Abuse, a non-profit organization 
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based in Johannesburg. Through her work, she has observed 
a tendency on the part of state actors to shy away from legal 
remedies to domestic violence. One woman, after having 
been physically dragged and threatened by her partner, 
recounted the following: 
 
When the police arrived I informed them that I 
wanted to leave the [perpetrator] and take my 
children with me. The police responded by 
saying that I should attempt to solve the 
matter, and that I could leave, but because it 
was already 4 a.m. it would be best if I let the 
children stay with the [perpetrator] for the 
remainder of the night and that I could return 
later that day to fetch them.76 
The police clearly failed to view the above situation as 
one in which the woman was in severe danger for her life 
and where a legal remedy would be appropriate. The fact 
that the police suggested that the children should be left 
with the abusive partner further demonstrates their 
perception of this incident of violence as one that should not 
prevent the victim from returning to co-habitate with her 
abuser. Similar attitudes can be found with other street-level 
bureaucrats charged with implementing the Domestic 
Violence Act, such as prosecutors and magistrates.77 In one 
instance, a prosecutor assigned to a case of domestic assault 
                                                
	
	
76 Interview (Mar. 4, 2014). 
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leading to the near-death of the victim informed Vance that 
he “felt sorry for the respondent” as it was “clear that he 
only did what he did because he loves his wife” (the victim). 
In another case, a magistrate sentenced a man accused of 
assaulting his wife to a 5-year suspended sentence. His 
reasoning for suspending the sentence was that this issue 
should have been resolved by the respective families of the 
parties and in his judgment he urged the families to come 
together to create unity between the victim and abuser.78 
 
C. HIV DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: SOUTH AFRICAN 
NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCE 
 
In 2001, the Court had occasion to make a definitive 
pronouncement on the unconstitutionality of employment 
discrimination against persons living with HIV.79 The South 
African National Defense Force (SANDF) nevertheless had 
adopted and continued to employ a complete ban on the 
recruitment of people living with HIV.80 This policy was 
challenged in 2008 in the High Court, which issued an order 
directing SANDF to amend its hiring and recruitment 
policies to comply with the Constitution. SANDF, in 
accordance with the court order, amended its policies to 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of HIV-positive status.81  
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On September 29, 2014, the High Court handed down 
judgment in a case challenging SANDF’s continued practice 
of discrimination against persons living with HIV.82 The 
High Court found that, despite the new employment 
policies, SANDF’s behavior was no different from the policy 
that was declared unconstitutional six years earlier.83 
SANDF’s justification for its behavior was that, over the six 
years since the court order, it had been receiving an 
overwhelming number of applications and was forced to 
therefore create a system by which to eliminate potential 
applicants.84 In defending its actions, SANDF asserted the 
following: “It is submitted that there are circumstances 
which justify the departure from the strict ipsissima verba of 
the order and that the respondents were entitled to apply 
their interpretation of the order, particularly in view of the 
changed circumstances that have presented themselves.”85 
The above statement demonstrates a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the role of judicial decision-making 
and its relationship to the functions of the executive arm of 
government. 
 
D. FAILURE TO INCORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
IN LAW-MAKING: THE CONCEPT OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
In 2009, in a highly controversial move, the President 
of South Africa signed into law legislation effectively 
disbanding the Directorate of Special Operations (DPO), a 
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specialized national crime-fighting unit, and replaced it with 
the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI).86 In 
2011, the Constitutional Court held in Glenister that the 
newly established DPCI was not sufficiently independent to 
pass constitutional muster.87 The Court suspended the 
declaration of unconstitutionality for a period of 18 months 
in order to give the executive the opportunity to remedy the 
defect.88 
The executive responded to the Court’s order with the 
South African Police Service Amendment Act,89 which was 
then challenged for non-compliance with the constitutional 
requirement for independence as outlined by the Court in 
Glenister.90 The case is currently before the Constitutional 
Court on appeal from the High Court, which found some, 
but not all, of the challenged provisions of the Amended Act 
unconstitutional.91 
There is nothing to suggest that in proposing the 
Amendment Act, the government intentionally included 
provisions that compromised the independence of the 
judiciary. At best, what it does suggest is a failure to fully 
understand the underlying principle of independence as 
outlined by the Constitutional Court. There is no need, for 
the purposes of this paper, to discuss each challenged 
provision of the Amendment Act. However, to demonstrate 
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the dissonance between the Court’s initial ruling and the 
executive’s implementation of that holding, an example is 
illustrative. 
In Glenister, the Court listed aspects of the laws 
governing the DPCI that compromised its independence.92 
Amongst those was the lack of employment security. “[T]he 
members of the new Directorate enjoy no specially 
entrenched employment security . . . . In our view, adequate 
independence requires special measures entrenching their 
employment security to enable them to carry out their duties 
vigorously.”93  
The DSO, unlike the new specialized unit, was 
governed by laws that provided for special removal 
procedures for their members, which in turn provided 
special protection that “served to reduce the possibility that 
an individual member could be threatened—or could feel 
threatened—with removal for failing to yield to pressure in a 
politically unpopular investigation or prosecution.”94 The 
clear underlying purpose of these protections is to minimize 
the possibility that a member of the unit could be 
compromised, thereby impacting the integrity and efficacy 
of the entire office. 
The Amendment Act uses language from the 
judgment but, according to the High Court, fails to meet the 
intent expressed therein.95 In Glenister, the Court uses the 
DSO legislation to demonstrate employment security, citing 
a provision, which states that a deputy may be removed 
from office only by the President, “on grounds of 
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misconduct, continued ill-health or incapacity, or if he or she 
is no longer a fit and proper person to hold the office.”96 
Section 17DA(2)(a) of the Amendment Act lists verbatim the 
above grounds on which a Head or Deputy Head of the 
DPCI can be suspended or removed from office.97 However, 
the following subsections allow for the Minister to suspend a 
Head or Deputy Head without a hearing and without pay.98  
The use of exact language in the Amendment Act 
suggests that the Executive referred to Glenister in drafting 
the new laws but failed to realize the underlying intent of 
the Court to ensure independence of a specialized anti-
corruption unit. The result, whether intentional or not on the 
part of the executive, is to undermine the Court’s 
authoritative legitimacy when a clear order and judgment of 
the Court fails to be incorporated into the government’s 
decision-making, which in turn impedes the ability of 
judicial decision-making to create substantial impact on the 
country’s structures and laws. 
 
III. EXECUTIVE RESPONSE TO JUDICIAL NORM CREATION 
 
The above examples clearly illustrate a divide 
between the judiciary’s construction of constitutional 
principles and decisions of the administrative state. 
Presently, the South African judiciary has remained 
independent and has not been subjected to overt and 
aggressive attacks. However, as Roux rightly suggests, a 
court’s institutional independence is composed of more than 
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just the absence of direct attacks from the executive.99 The 
effective carrying out of the judiciary’s role in ensuring that 
all branches of government are held to the prescripts of the 
Constitution is also contingent on acquiescence to its 
judgments. The examples above demonstrate that the 
approach the judiciary has adopted to build and protect its 
independence, while perhaps successful in avoiding direct 
attacks, has not necessarily led to acquiescence of the 
executive. Simply put, if the executive simply ignores or 
only half-heartedly implements court judgments, this 
undermines institutional independence, or at best renders it, 
and the Court, less relevant, regardless of whether an overt 
attack on the court has been made.  
To fully understand the way in which judicial 
decisions are incorporated into the work of the executive, it 
is important to recognize that the executive is highly 
complex.100 It is made up of diverse activities that produce a 
multiplicity of decisions before a final decision is made 
which can be judicially reviewed. Likewise, there exist a 
complex set of processes, activities, and dynamics that occur 
in response to a judgment of a court. It is on these processes 
and dynamics that the prospects for the accurate and faithful 
implementation of a judicial decision rest.  
Furthermore, judicial decisions can influence 
executive decision-making both directly and indirectly. They 
may do so directly through a clear court order targeting the 
behavior of a particular public body or actor. A decision may 
also indirectly influence executive behavior through the 
legal norms that emerge from a judgment. Any form of 
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judicial decision-making directed at public actors, whether 
constitutional or administrative, deals with a particular 
administrative, executive, or parliamentary act or decision. 
Despite this particularity, through stare decisis and the 
formulation of objective principles and norms, judicial 
decisions typically aim to affect future decision-making of 
whichever public body is the subject of the judgment, as well 
as act as a repository of principle and legal norms from 
which all public bodies should draw in order to guide their 
behavior and decision-making.101 These values are part of 
the courts’ process of norm creation and should then 
permeate all executive decision-making.102 
Public bodies or actors to which judgments are 
directed can be categorized as either senior-level executives 
or street-level bureaucrats.103 This is predicated on the 
Weberian conception of bureaucracy in which the 
bureaucracy is divided into individual decision-makers, who 
are situated at different levels of a hierarchy.104 However, we 
depart from the classic Weberian conception in that 
directives issued from one level of the hierarchy to the next 
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are not necessarily carried out accurately and faithfully,105 as 
evidenced by the examples in Section II. 
Within this model, the specific category of 
bureaucratic decision-makers responsible for the 
implementation of executive policy is street-level 
bureaucrats.106 These include decision-makers in public 
institutions, such as schools, police, welfare departments, 
environmental agencies and various other administrative 
agencies, as well as government departments. Lipsky argues 
that the public policy that is developed by senior members 
of the executive or parliament is typically different from that 
which is experienced by the public when engaging with 
street-level bureaucrats tasked with implementing that 
policy.107 
Therefore, if bureaucracies are, to a certain extent, “at 
the mercy of lower participants,”108 what factors actually 
guide decision-making of street-level bureaucrats? What 
reference points are used when interpreting the directives 
issued by their superiors and the legislation that governs 
their operation? 
Disagreement over a policy or the interpretation of 
governing legislation is one clear factor that guides the 
decision-making of street-level bureaucrats.109 It is easy to 
imagine that disagreement with the formal constraints that 
they face in the form of policy prescriptions would 
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contribute to a less than whole-hearted compliance with 
those policies. 
Another factor is the need to develop coping 
mechanisms.110 At the core of Lipsky’s argument is the 
assertion that the inherent circumstances of the tasks faced 
by street-level bureaucrats give rise to pragmatic solutions 
that often deviate from stated policy, rules, and regulations, 
and are tacitly accepted by their seniors as a necessity to 
ensure that a task is completed.111 These coping mechanisms 
are the responses that street-level bureaucrats develop to 
deal with challenges that result from inadequate resources, 
few controls, indeterminate objectives, and discouraging 
circumstances.112 Given this complexity and variety in the 
circumstances in which street-level bureaucrats are required 
to operate, Lipsky concludes that prescribed responses are 
not only inappropriate but impossible, which means that 
discretion is inevitable.113 These coping mechanisms 
manifest in three forms: the use of routines and stereotyping, 
the modification of the scope of their duty in order to bridge 
the gap between objectives and resources, and the 
modification of perceptions of clients to bridge the gap 
between objectives and accomplishments.114 
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Within the discretionary space afforded to street-level 
bureaucrats, there exists a complex mesh of incentives and 
norms that influence the manner in which decisions at this 
level are made, including decisions regarding the 
construction of coping mechanisms. On the one hand, as 
agents of their superiors, street-level bureaucrats are subject 
to certain mechanisms designed to align their incentives 
with those of their superiors. On the other hand, street-level 
bureaucrats are subject to their own normative assumptions. 
In cases where the social norms held by street-level 
bureaucrats diverge from the legal norms underlying policy, 
these assumptions and prejudices are more likely to manifest 
themselves in the decisions taken. For instance, a xenophobic 
state actor tasked with the granting of asylum to foreigners 
may be more likely to deviate from policies related to the 
treatment of asylum seekers than if his views aligned with 
the legal norms underlying those policies. Similarly, a police 
officer investigating an incident of domestic violence, who 
believes that male dominance in the home is the norm, may 
allow this belief to influence his decision-making and 
perhaps lead to a less than thorough investigation.  
Given that the street-level bureaucrats are not 
political appointees and need not display political fealty to 
any particular ideology, their norms most likely 
proportionately reflect those of a large portion of society.115 
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As mentioned above, the increased and inevitable discretion 
that breeds the various coping mechanisms used by street-
level bureaucrats allows for these coping mechanisms to, in 
part, be shaped by the social norms that guide their 
behavior. As a result, what becomes relevant are the set of 
norms that society has adopted. If societal norms reflected 
principles such as equality of the sexes and the eradication of 
prejudice, it is safe to assume that instances of inequality 
would be reduced.116 Similarly, if street-level bureaucrats 
internalized these same principles, instances of inequality or 
injustice arising from their decisions and behavior would be 
reduced.117 
Take, for example, the decision of SANDF to employ 
discriminatory hiring practices in the face of a clear directive 
by the court to refrain from such discrimination. In that case, 
SANDF identified in its arguments a challenge to its 
function, namely, an overwhelming number of applications 
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for employment.118 Its reaction to this challenge was to 
develop a coping mechanism: the practice of discriminating 
against persons with HIV in hiring. It perceived the court 
order as subject to deviation in order to justify its 
behavior.119 SANDF’s actions clearly demonstrate the impact 
on access to justice of a divergence between judicially 
created norms and social norms on the treatment of persons 
living with HIV. 
 
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF NORMS  
 
Social norms play an important role in the decision-
making of members of society, regardless of their 
professional context.120 In other words, social norms 
infiltrate the decision-making of all individuals to varying 
degrees, regardless of the context in which the decisions are 
made. Likewise, it has been argued that social norms may 
operate so strongly that they can, at times, guide behavior at 
the expense of applicable legal rules.121 This claim has been 
made quite convincingly in the legal realist movement,122 
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law and society literature,123 and organizational 
economics.124 In fact, studies have shown an inverse 
relationship between the enforcement of law and the social 
norms that exist within a community.125 In other words, 
where the law conflicts with social norms, the enforcement 
of the law declines substantially. 
One explanation for this phenomenon is that the 
sanctions applied by a community on individuals that 
deviate from a social norm, such as guilt or shame,126 are a 
more effective motivational force for adherence than legal 
sanctions or sanctions imposed by an entity external to the 
community. These sanctions provide an enforcement 
mechanism which results in a community’s negative 
reaction to a transgressor’s actions.  
The question is then what role social norms play in 
guiding executive action in the implementation of judicial 
decisions. In exploring this question, we do not attempt to 
argue the extent to which judicial decisions can change 
social norms. Rather, we simply accept that, with respect to 
the social norms held by the broader public, the intention of 
court judgments is to perform an expressive function.127 By 
that we mean that judgments are statements on what is good 
                                                
	
	
123 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55, 62 n.7 (1963); see generally Mark H. 
Van Pelt, Symposium, Law, Private Governance and Continuing 
Relationships, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 461 (1985). 
124 Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, Social Norms and the 
Enforcement of Laws (Aug. 3, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2443427.  
125 Id. 
126 Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, 
with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369 (1999). 
127 See Sunstein, supra note 120, at 903. 
2015 EXECUTIVE ACQUIESCENCE 121 
and bad and through the articulation and promulgation of 
these statements, courts attempt to influence existing norms 
and behavior of those to whom a judgment is addressed. In 
the context of this paper, the courts are addressing the 
executive. As such, one should assume that an important 
purpose of the judgment is to alter the behavior of the 
executive. Thus, there is the potential for conflicts to arise 
between the judgment and social norms held by the 
bureaucrats to whom the judgment is addressed.  
The judiciary is, through the mechanism of review 
(whether constitutional or administrative), involved in the 
process of constituting and propounding legal norms. 
However, in using as its reference point a value-laden 
constitution, these legal norms set a normative standard to 
which both the state and society are called to comply with. 
When courts are confronted with a review of government 
action, whether directly with reference to a right enshrined 
in the Bill of Rights, or indirectly through the mechanism of 
administrative law, it is giving content to and creating a 
legal norm. These legal norms then either stand in contrast 
to or confirm social norms already held by all or a portion of 
society.  
The difficulty with the judiciary’s position is that the 
values in the Constitution, which form the reference point 
for all adjudication, are themselves contested concepts. 
Principles such as “equality” and “dignity” can have varied 
interpretations and a general consensus from all members of 
society can be neither assumed nor expected.128 For example, 
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and with reference to the cases discussed in Section II, the 
essence of the meaning of gender equality that emerges in 
Baloyi, the imperative to treat foreigners with dignity and 
respect in Lawyers for Human Rights, and the importance of 
carrying out governmental tasks free of favor and corruption 
in Glenister, all find their roots in the Constitution. However, 
the meaning of these norms varies widely across social 
groupings. Given the normative plurality that emerges, it is 
not difficult to imagine that a gap may emerge between the 
manner in which courts understand these norms and the 
manner in which these norms are interpreted in different 
social groupings. 
We would argue that social norms can translate 
themselves into state action in two ways: a direct and an 
indirect method. The direct method exists simply by product 
of the fact that bureaucrats are members of society. Thus, the 
sets of norms adopted by this community of bureaucrats 
often proportionately represent those of the communities 
from which the members are drawn. As a result, where 
judicially-created norms conflict with societal norms, they 
often also conflict with norms directing the behavior of 
street-level bureaucrats. 
The important question is, therefore, what explains 
the instances in which bureaucrats are not effectively 
constrained by laws or court judgments? The answer, under 
the direct method, has been persuasively argued by Lipsky: 
street-level bureaucrats constitute a community and are 
strongly influenced by the norms prevalent in that 
community, often more than they are influenced by those 
created by the judiciary.129 In fact, the process of social 
norms manifesting themselves as cognitive tools, such as 
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stereotyping through which people perceive and understand 
the world around them, can be so insidious that it often 
occurs without our awareness.130 In this way, discriminatory 
beliefs and ideas are absorbed unconsciously by individuals 
who find themselves in bureaucratic positions wielding 
discretion in the making of administrative decisions.131 
A useful example of the relative inadequacy of 
external controls of street-level bureaucrats is Somali 
Association.132 The South African Police Service (SAPS) in 
Limpopo initiated a policy called “Operation Hardstick” to 
close businesses in Limpopo that were operating without 
requisite permits.133 In carrying out the SAPS policy, 
policemen closed 600 businesses, many with valid licenses, 
confiscated equipment and stock, and arrested traders and 
their employees.134 The policemen further told traders that 
foreigners are not permitted to operate businesses in South 
Africa and that the foreigners, who were predominantly 
Somali and Ethiopian traders, should leave the 
municipality.135 The SCA described instances of xenophobic 
pressure being exerted by local business forums before this 
policy was adopted, which ostensibly contributed to the 
manner in which the police carried out the policy.136 These 
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actions were taken despite the fact that the policy’s objective 
was the removal of unlicensed businesses and many of the 
businesses targeted possessed valid licenses.137 
As a final example, in Baloyi and Omar, the Court 
effectively removed domestic violence from the sphere of 
private family matters and placed it squarely within the 
ambit of the state’s obligation to uphold the Constitution.138 
In so doing, the Court created legal norms regarding 
perceptions of victims of domestic violence and appropriate 
responses to violence in the home. As displayed above, the 
legal norms created by the Court have had little impact on 
the behavior of street-level bureaucrats, like police officers, 
in their treatment of victims of domestic violence.  
In some ways, the tension between social and legal 
norms and its impact on the effective implementation of 
judicial decisions in South Africa can be analogized to the 
circumstances under which international law, and 
particularly international human rights law, operates. The 
perpetual concern with international law is the need to 
create incentives for states to comply with international 
norms in the absence of any mechanisms designed to coerce 
or enforce compliance. One argument pioneered by Harold 
Koh is that a lack of compliance may partly, or wholly, be 
based on the divide between international law norms and 
the domestic norms (social, legal, or constitutional) that exist 
in the recalcitrant state.139 Quite simply, when such norms 
diverge, international law becomes less effective in guiding 
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state behavior.140 Koh then posits that greater compliance 
could be achieved if international norms were better 
internalized within the state.141  
Turning back to South Africa, where effective police 
enforcement is influenced by social norms adopted by police 
officers, a similar internalization of legal and constitutional 
norms would lead to better compliance with judicial 
decisions. This is not to say that all street-level bureaucrats 
must come to agree with the substance of legal norms. 
Rather, they must internalize the necessity of compliance 
with these legal norms, even when they conflict with social 
norms. 
The indirect method is through the political pressure 
created by groups in society that reflect social norms and 
wish to have those norms manifested in administrative 
decision-making. The state’s need to respond to those 
groups is obviously contingent on the political power 
wielded by the groups. When such norms are held by a 
politically powerful bloc, they may become more influential 
than social norms held by society more generally because of 
the clear intent of these groups to impact government 
behavior. Where a divergence exists between social norms 
and the behavior of the bureaucracy, political pressure 
should in theory encourage government compliance with 
social norms. While the purpose of this paper is not to 
engage too deeply in what is the much larger and well-
traversed subject of aligning government interests with 
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social norms, it is sufficient to rely on the notion of 
democratic constitutionalism, which encapsulates the 
application of such political pressure. Through various non-
legal means, social groups seek to influence the content of 
constitutional law and in this way translate political power 
into executive action.142 This indirect process of norms 
percolating upwards from social groups is, however, not the 
focus of this paper because it requires the existence of a 
mobilized and active citizenry in order to present a 
sufficiently powerful and recognizable political bloc. In the 
normative issues that arise in the examples presented in 
Section II, there is no clear evidence of any such political 
movement to which the executive was responding. More 
relevant to these particular examples is the direct manner in 
which norms infiltrate administrative decision-making 
through the actions of street-level bureaucrats.  
It is important to note that the ability of social norms 
to negatively impact the implementation of court judgments 
does not suggest that those judgments are therefore without 
value. There is inherent value in the expression of a higher 
standard to which the Constitution expects individuals in 
society and the state to behave. Such expressions enter the 
arena of public thought and are important features of a 
social discourse that plays a role in the transformation of 
society. However, this should not detract from the need for 
court judgments to be effective. In order to understand how 
court judgments can be ineffective, one needs to understand 
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the role that social norms play in the executive decision-
making process. 
It is important to acknowledge that social norms are 
not determinative of how executive decisions are made. 
Their influence depends in large part on the level of 
discretion an individual street-level bureaucrat has in his or 
her decision-making. Poor implementation of legal norms 
may also be a function of the manner in which judicial 
decisions are communicated from the courts to street-level 
bureaucrats. Therefore, a closer look at the interactions 
between the judiciary and the executive, and between higher 
and lower level executives, is relevant to any discussion of 
the effect of judicial decision-making on the executive and 
will be explored in the next section. 
 
V. INTERACTION BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS 
 
It is important to understand the process of executive 
decision-making in order to identify possible reasons why 
judicially-constructed norms do not filter down to affect the 
behavior of street-level bureaucrats. While there has been 
limited research in this area,143 efforts have been made to 
describe, in theory, the path that judicial norms take within 
the executive. Hertogh144 and Canon145 have each created 
similar models of administrative decision-making that are 
instructive. Our description below relies primarily on 
Hertogh’s model. That model describes the process of 
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administrative decision-making in three phases: information, 
transformation, and processing. In our view, these phases are 
all subject to the manner in which each institution and level 
within the executive communicates with one another.  
 
A. INFORMATION 
 
The information phase is the process of relevant 
individuals within the government, most often senior-level 
executives, coming to understand the content of a judicial 
decision.146 This involves interpretation and extraction of 
principles and guidance or orders from the judgment.147 This 
process ranges in complexity. On the one hand, the 
department to whom the judgment is addressed will likely 
need only to understand and follow the order of the court 
without interrogating in great detail the court’s reasoning. 
On the other hand, state actors whose duties fall within the 
ambit of a judgment, but are not directly cited in the legal 
proceeding that gave rise to the matter, will have to 
extrapolate a general principle from the reasoning in the 
judgment and apply it to the distinct context in which they 
find themselves. This may be a decidedly more complex 
task. 
In this respect it is important to understand the role of 
the form of communication between the two arms of 
government. As mentioned above, this communication takes 
place primarily by means of a judgment. As a result, if the 
judgment is poorly written, reasoned, or difficult to 
comprehend, the manner in which it is implemented by 
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senior-level executives tasked with understanding it will 
vary.148  
 
B. TRANSFORMATION 
 
Once senior-level executives believe that a judgment 
calls for behavioral change, they must decide what change 
should take place.149 This then forms a crucial stage for 
determining the judgment’s impact. The impact of a judicial 
decision is arguably hampered by the degree to which the 
status quo is entrenched within the bureaucracy. If executive 
decision-makers are overly attached to the current norms, 
they may prove reluctant to change behaviors or procedures 
to better align with legal norms constructed by a court. It is 
this desire to maintain the status quo that may explain the 
executive’s tendency to appeal decisions of lower courts 
requiring a change in behavior, as was done by the 
Department of Home Affairs in the context of detention and 
deportation procedures.  
A reason for the executive’s attachment to the status 
quo could be the desire to avoid the costs involved in 
altering administrative behavior. Other reasons could be that 
a judgment forces a divergence from the agency’s primary 
objectives or limits the domain over which the agency may 
exercise power. 
Another possibility is that an agency may disagree 
with a court’s interpretation of its empowering statute. 
                                                
	
	
148 See generally ANTONY N. ALLOTT, THE LIMITS OF LAW (1980); RICHARD 
M. JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE: SUPREME COURT DECISION-
MAKING FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE (1967); STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT 
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES (1970). 
149 See Hertogh, supra note 144, at 58.   
130 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
Given the agency’s expertise on the subject-matter of its 
work, a doctrine of deference with respect to agencies’ 
interpretation of the law, much like that found in the United 
States, could prove useful in mediating conflicting 
interpretations.150 In creating a mechanism which would 
limit opportunities for the judiciary and agencies to 
explicitly disagree on the interpretation of the law, agencies 
would be permitted to make reasonable decisions. 
Unfortunately, South African jurisprudence has yet to 
develop a rigorous doctrine comparable to Chevron.151 
However, even where agencies are afforded deference, their 
decisions must conform to the normative requirements of 
the Constitution.152 As such, deference would be not able to 
excuse the administrative decisions described in Section II. 
 
C. PROCESSING 
 
This stage involves the potential reactions from 
within the agency to the proposed change in the 
administrative process in order to conform with the 
judgment.153 As mentioned above, a change in policy in 
response to a court judgment will typically occur at senior 
levels of the administrative agency as, for example, what 
occurred in the developing of rules governing an anti-
corruption unit.154 However, as the directive containing the 
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change in policy begins to move down the administrative 
hierarchy, it may encounter resistance. SANDF’s failure to 
comply with constitutional hiring policies created in 
response to a court order is an example of resistance within 
an agency to policies created by senior level executives. This 
resistance manifests in defensive mechanisms through 
which bureaucrats attempt to avoid the application of the 
change. These mechanisms may include exploiting the 
inability of the court to monitor implementation by 
obscuring the decision-making process or creating and then 
exploiting a technicality in the law that justifies the 
avoidance.  
The motivation to adopt these avoidance techniques, 
especially at street-level, may be that bureaucrats have 
become attached to the coping mechanisms that they have 
developed and, even in the face of demands from their 
superiors, may be reluctant to abandon those tools. 
Alternatively, a failure in implementation of a judgment 
may come as a result of a clash between legal norms and 
existing societal norms.  
 
D. COMMUNICATION 
 
In our view, a central theme that runs through the 
three processes above is communication. This is so prevalent 
that the three phases become less distinct than initially 
suggested. At the first level of communication, the court is 
primarily communicating with the administrative agency, 
the lower courts, and the general public. This 
communication most often comes in the form of a judgment. 
At the second level of communication, senior-level 
executives communicate their interpretation of the court’s 
judgment in the form of altered policies to street-level 
bureaucrats. Here, the method of communication is typically 
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“soft law,” which includes rules, regulations, and guidelines 
developed by senior-level executives.155 The effectiveness of 
reception, understanding, and, to a large extent, compliance 
rests on the quality of communication at each level.156 
At the first level of communication, an example from 
the Constitutional Court offers a compelling argument for 
greater attention to clarity in the penning of judicial 
reasoning. A lack of clarity in a judgment can provide a 
recalcitrant state (or lower court judges) the opportunity to 
justify non-acquiescence.157 In our view, a clear and 
unambiguous judgment does as much to limit this likelihood 
as it does to limit the possibility of confusion in good faith 
efforts to abide by the ruling.  
An example demonstrating the need for clarity in 
judgments is Walele.158 The Constitutional Court’s majority 
judgment in Walele held that a local authority cannot 
approve building plans, even should they comply with the 
requirements articulated in the legislation governing 
buildings standards, unless it is satisfied that the proposed 
building will not disfigure the area in which it is built or 
“derogate the value” of surrounding property.159 The 
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majority judgment of the SCA in True Motives disagreed 
with the majority held view in Walele.160 When confronted 
with the argument that Walele stood as precedent and 
governed the facts in True Motives, the SCA argued that the 
portion of the judgment in which the relevant passages 
resided were obiter and therefore were not legally binding 
for the purposes of True Motives.161 Furthermore, the SCA 
argued that the relevant portions of the judgment were 
wrong.162 A particularly telling remark by the SCA when 
justifying its departure from Walele is that certain 
paragraphs “of Walele [are], at best, ambiguous”163 and 
“with respect, wrong.”164 In a recent judgment, the 
Constitutional Court held predictably that the statements 
made in Walele were not obiter and therefore constituted 
binding precedent for all lower courts, including the SCA.165 
Communication through judgments is also important 
in ensuring that the judgment is implemented as intended at 
the street-level. At the second level of communication, the 
formal manifestations of this communication are rules, 
regulations, and guidelines (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as “rules”). However, given the inevitable existence of 
discretion at the street-level, this raises the interesting 
relationship between rules and discretion. The matter was 
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dealt with by the Constitutional Court in Dawood,166 where 
skepticism of wide and unregulated discretion was 
expressed. As a solution to the presence of discretion, which 
resulted in the violation of a constitutional right, the 
Constitutional Court ordered that, when faced with wide 
discretion, parliament must draft rules and guidelines that 
better articulate the manner in which administrative 
agencies should implement legislation.167 
Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court neglected to 
grapple with several issues. First, while the Court correctly 
concedes that discretion will always be present,168 it appears 
to assume a rather simple relationship between rules and 
discretion. The judgment defines this relationship as that 
between two inversely correlated factors. Therefore, the 
more there is of one, the less there is of the other. Rules, 
however, are complex instruments and their impact on 
discretion is often unknown. It is difficult, and some would 
argue impossible, to predict how bureaucrats will react to 
rules or what consequences may result from the 
promulgation of rules. In order to deal with this reality, 
jurisdictions such as the United States have created rigorous 
rule-making procedures169 and agencies for the review of 
proposed rules.170 Again, these steps have not been taken to 
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the same extent in South Africa.171 Ultimately, without the 
necessary processes to assess and revise, rules may be 
counterproductive to efficient decision-making by street-
level bureaucrats.172  
Second, Dawood assumes that parliament is the best 
entity for the development of rules.173 Typically, arguments 
relating to the effective operation of administrative agencies 
suggest that the agency itself should formulate rules or 
guidelines that govern its own operation.174 While this may 
be true in theory, this position could potentially create a 
rather absurd result in the instances illustrated in Section II. 
If agency leaders are provided with the opportunity to create 
rules based on their understanding of a court judgment and 
that understanding could be mistaken or be guided by extra-
legal concerns, the rules that would emanate from that 
agency would themselves fail to accord with legal norms. 
Ultimately, the adequate implementation of the judgment 
still rests on the understanding and acceptance of the 
judgment by the agency leaders. However, what agency 
rules would provide is a clear signal of what the agency 
understands the legal and constitutional norms to be. Such 
rules provide the opportunity to test such understandings 
through judicial review and correct any flaws that may exist. 
Nevertheless, as illustrated above, this is not a complete 
solution. Decisions of street-level bureaucrats may be 
impervious to any formal constraint, including agency rules.   
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It is important to note that understanding the 
transmission of legal norms through the executive is 
important in aiding good-faith efforts by bureaucrats to 
abide by legal norms. If there is an overwhelming belief that 
legal norms should be adhered to, despite social norms 
personally held by individual executive decision-makers, an 
understanding of the way in which decisions-makers discern 
legal norms becomes valuable.175 However, institutional 
dynamics only help to a point. When legal or constitutional 
and social norms conflict sharply and there is no overriding 
influence to abide by the legal or constitutional norm, then 
the likelihood exists that social norms will dictate the 
outcome of administrative decision-making.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to 
democracy was carefully orchestrated to avoid further 
conflict and oppression from the state. At the core of this 
transition was the creation of a new Constitution and the 
inauguration of a Constitutional Court specifically tasked 
with its promotion and protection. Given the nation’s 
history, the Constitution embodied more than rights and 
principles, it strove to create a vision for a new South Africa; 
one we recognize has not yet been achieved but that the 
government has been tasked with developing. In the process 
of creating this new South Africa, the courts continually 
refine the nation’s understanding of our Constitution and 
the appropriate implementation of its principles through 
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their judgments and orders. Despite the careful thought and 
great effort that has gone into the Constitution and 
subsequent judicial decisions, the reality for many South 
Africans remains divorced from the principles enshrined in 
the Constitution.  
In this paper we propose that a significant cause of 
this rift is the behavior of street-level bureaucrats who, 
acting with an inevitable degree of discretion, have the 
power to make decisions that either remain faithful to 
constitutional principles reflected in judicial decisions or 
diverge from them substantially. We suggest that the 
behavior of street-level bureaucrats can be better 
understood, and hopefully corrected, through a careful 
examination of two factors: the influence of social norms on 
individuals, as well as the interactions between and within 
government agencies. If legal norms hope to take precedence 
over social norms in the behavior of street-level bureaucrats, 
the gap between legal and social norms must be addressed. 
The means with which to address this gap, whether by 
influencing societal norms or creating stronger incentives to 
comply with legal norms, is beyond the scope of this paper 
and will likely vary across the country and subject matter. 
This paper seeks to begin the process by identifying the sites 
that require further study and from which we hope solutions 
may emerge. With regard to interactions between 
institutions, clarity in court judgments and the effective 
transmission of such orders requires both clarity in the 
judgments themselves and the development of effective 
rules that can be judicially reviewed.    
Though aspects of the vision of a new South Africa 
remain unfulfilled, the foundation for higher standards of 
conduct for both the government and society has been set 
through the creation of a forward-looking Constitution. 
Through careful reflection on our current reality and a 
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willingness to change in order to move forward, significant 
steps can be made towards achieving that vision. 
 
